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PREFACE 
Over the past few years prices received by New Zealand for traditio~al 
pastoral exports have been low. Whether the apparent recovery in the 
U.S. economy in 1983 will lift prices fer most N.Z. export products 
remains uncertain. Some lift in the wool and beef markets has been 
experienced so far but the outlook for sheepmeats and dairy products 
is far less positive. 
The recent protracted fall in the agricultural sector's terms of 
trade has been accompanied by increasing government financial support 
for the sector. The objective of this paper is to present a framework 
within which financial assistance to the sector may be discussed. The 
authors approach this task from the viewpoint of efficient resource allocation. 
The following paper was presented by the authors to the New Zealand 
Branch Conference of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society held 
at Wellington in August 1983. 
Other papers concerned with support for the agricultural sector 
published recently by the A.E.R.U. include Discussion Papers No. 63 
("Supplementary Minimum Prices : a production incentive?") and No. 70 
("The Pastoral Livestock Sector and The Supplementary Minimum Price 
Policy") . 
( iii) 
P.D. Chudleigh 
Director 

1 . INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides a framework within which financial assistance 
to New Zealand agriculture may be discussed. It reiterates a number 
of principles that can be found in what may be termed a 'State of the 
Art' paper given by Bushnell, Durbin and Johnson to the Conference of 
the New Zealand Association of Economists 12 months ago. 
Assistance to the agricultural sector involves the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 
Ministry of Works and Development, Department of Lands and Survey, Rural 
Banking and Finance Corporation, Maori Affairs Department and the Forest 
Service. The assistance provided covers a wide range of areas within 
the sector, mainly related to subsidies of various forms. (A full breakdown 
of assistance categories and levels for 1979/80, 1980/81 and 1981/82 
is given in the Appendix). 
For the 1981/82 year, total gross direct assistance was $347 million, 
of which the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was responsible for 
$340 million. However, total gross indirect assistance for 1981/82 was 
$472 million which comprised $203 million of expenditure and $269 million 
of revenue foregone as a result of interest subsidies. Total gross assistance 
to the agricultural sector was therefore $819 million in 1981/82. After 
providing for tax payments on income supplements, the net assistance 
was $693 million .. 
Such assistance levels must be viewed in the context of the size 
of the sector and the level of activity of the Government in the total 
economy. Total net Government expenditure in 1981/82 was $1 I, 197 million. 
Gross assistance to the agricultural sector consisted of 7.3% of whole 
Government expenditure and 17.3% of agricultural export earnings. Perhaps 
a more significant comparison is the relationship between gross Government 
assistance to agriculture and agricultural proprietors' surplus; in 1981/82, 
the ratio was 66.6% (see Appendix). 
It is therefore apparent that Government assistance to the agricultural 
sector constitutes a substantial part of total Government expenditure 
and represents a major part of the agricultural proprietors' surplus. 
The identification of an appropriate framework within which such assistance 
can be evaluated is therefore important. 
This task has been approached from an efficiency viewpoint, whereby 
government assistance can only be justified in terms of improving the 
environment in which the market model operates. No attempt has been 
made to explain the reasons for existing government assistance to the 
New Zealand agricultural sector as there may well be considerations other 
than efficiency which have led to the introduction of various assistance 
measures. 
I. 
2. 
Five possible justifications for financial assistance, including 
compensation for trade protection, exchange rate overvaluation, internal 
protectionism, economic instability, and market failure are reviewed, 
thereby providing a framework for further analysis of the subject. This 
is followed by an assessment of the appropriate economic policies for 
the economy, an assessment of the level of present agricultural assistance 
that could be justified and some views on future assistance policies. 
2. RATIONALE FOR ASSISTANCE 
2.1 Compensation for Trade Protection 
Assistance to the export sector has been justified (Muldoon 1982, 
1983) on the grounds of compensation for higher input prices paid by 
farmers (and subsequently lowered incomes and output) as a consequence 
of trade protection afforded to the manufacturing sector. This 'tariff 
compensation' argument has stimulated considerable debate, particularly 
in Australia, over the past decade. 
The argument for tariff compensation appears to have two distinct 
facets. One has been concerned with the country's efficient allocation 
of resources and the other concerned with income distribution. 
2.1.1 Efficient allocation of resources. 
Most economists agree that the best method of removing inefficiency 
in resource use stemming from trade protection is to gradually eliminate 
the protection. Even though this method has had a large measure of support 
from economists, it has not been pursued very actively by New Zealand 
politicians. This is due,at least in part, to the problems of adjustment. 
Politicians have paid some lip service to the ideal, but have made only 
a few positive moves (such as tendering for import licences) combined 
with a 'now is not the time' excuse for inaction. 
Because of the political difficulty involved in dismantling current 
trade protection measures, another method of removing resource-use 
distortions between productive sectors, caused by trade protection, would 
be to give all industries equivalent assistance. For example, with no 
changes in trade protection, each New Zealand industry adversely affected 
would be given an appropriate amount of assistance so that all industries 
could compete for resources on an equal basis. Application of this full 
compensation method is constrained by a number of factors: 
(i) Information 
An enormous amount of information would be required to determine 
the appropriate levels of compensation. Even the experienced 
Australian Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) has not been 
able to include all relevant distortions in its effective rate 
measure nor does· it cover all industries in the Australian economy 
(Crowley, pers. comm. 1983). The resources needed to carry out 
the appropriate calculations would be large and may significantly 
reduce any real income increments gained by compensating. 
(ii) Costs 
Apart from the costs associated with the acquisition of information, 
the budgetary costs of complete compensatory assistance are likely 
to be very high and therefore prohibitive. 
3. 
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In addition to these constraints, resources would be required for 
administration and others would be transferred between taxpayers and 
producers. 
The principal form of trade protection compensation that has been 
argued may be termed 'partial' compensation, rather than the 'perfect' 
compensation discussed above. The partial compensation argument is that 
until trade protection is removed some assistance to disadvantaged industries 
such as agriculture will at least move resources in the right direction 
and will lead to a higher level of real national income. This is clearly 
a 'second-best' argument and has been hotly debated in the Austral,ian 
literature over the past decade. In the authors' opinion the outcome 
has been inconclusive. It appears to be uncertain whether there will 
be an improvement in resource allocation under a partial compensation 
policy, largely because of a lack of knowledge of the complementarity 
and substitutability of resources between industries. In other words, 
it is not certain that resources will flow from trade-protected industries 
to less protected industries. For example, in the New Zealand situation, 
compensatory assistance to the pastoral sector might see resources flowing 
from the arable sector of agriculture rather than from the manufacturing 
sector. Compensatory assistance to all of New Zealand agriculture might 
see resources flowing from an efficient manufacturing sub-sector or pastoral 
sector to the highly protected viticulture sector. Recently, the Australian 
Balderstone Report (1982) concluded 'The outcome of such compensation 
on resource allocation between industries and sectors is unclear' . 
Consequently, the group concluded that there was insufficient evidence 
to justify tariff compensation to agriculture on the grounds of improving 
resource allocation .. 
In summary, a policy of perfect compensation to all industries! 
sectors appears impracticable because of the information required and 
the budgetary costs .. Partial compensation to the disadvantaged industries 
could be achieved in practice but the outcome in efficiency terms is unclear. 
Only the dismantling of trade protection mechanisms will allow the maximum 
efficiency of resource use to be attained. 
2.1.2 Income distribution. 
It has been argued in Australia that compensation to agriculture 
for trade protection can be justified on the grounds of lowered farm 
incomes (Balderstone et al., 1982). Previously, in the Australian Green 
Paper (Harris et al., 1974), it had been contended that- a countercyclical 
policy of compensatory assistance, that is, assistance which is reduced 
when farm incomes are high, would contribute both to economic efficiency 
and welfare. 
These arguments suggest that farm incomes should be supported, not 
on resource allocation grounds, but on distributive grounds as part of 
social policy. In New Zealand it has never been part of social policy 
to subsidise the incomes of those disadvantaged by economic policy, except to 
maintain a basic standard of living. A skilled tradesman, unemployed as a 
result of structural adjustment, receives the same benefits from Government as 
an unskilled labourer. To suggest that a particular group of individuals 
should be favoured over others more financially disadvantaged can hardly 
be acceptable on equity grounds. 
5. 
If income subsidisation cannot be justified on equity grounds then 
it is not possible to divorce the issue of farm incomes from that of 
resource allocation, since incomes are simply the returns to the resources 
employed in the production process. If tariff compensation cannot be 
justified on resource allocation grounds, it cannot, for similar reasons, 
be justified in terms of income distribution. 
However, if Government desires to assist a particular sector on 
income distribution grounds, either countercyclically or continuously, 
it should at least be aware of the uncertain.efficiency considerations. 
In addition, Government would have a responsibility to ensure the reasons 
for such assistance were made known. Any assistance given on income 
distribution grounds should be a direct supplement to income and be 
in the form of a lump sum payment in order to minimize distortions to 
resource allocation. 
2.2 Compensation for an Over-valued Exchange Rate 
Assistance to New Zealand exporters (and thus to New Zealand 
agriculture) has been defended on the basis of compensating for a largely 
fixed and over-valued exchange rate. The orthodox policy of devaluation 
has been used sparingly in past New Zealand economic policy largely 
because of fears concerning possible inflationary effects. 
Given that the exchange rate has been over-valued (at least since 
the mid seventies)~assistance to agriculture could be seen to be a 
means of enticing those resources into the agricultural sector which 
would be directed there naturally if the balance-of-payments were in 
equilibrium. 
Even if the extent of exchange rate over-valuation could be accurately 
.calculated, compensation would involve costs associated with information 
collection and administration and may induce distortions between sectors 
in the economy. It could not therefore be regarded as a 'first-best' 
solution. 
As with trade protection compensation the effect of assistance 
given to industries or sectors on partial exchange rate compensation 
grounds is unce~tain. Even if resources do move into the assisted 
sectors, there is no guarantee that these resources come from those 
sectors which benefit from exchange rate over-valuation. 
2.3 Compensation for Internal Protectionism 
This argument is that protection of other sectors of the economy via 
policies such as licensing and real wage maintenance warrants compensation of 
disadvantaged sectors by the taxpayer. Because of this internal protection, 
a disproportionate share of the effects of a downturn in the terms 
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of trade is borne by the producing sector. Removal of internal protection 
through policies such as delicencing of the freezing and road transport 
industries is being pursued as a 'first-best' policy in this regard. 
However, other rigidities such as those inherent in the wage bargaining 
process are still to be resolved. Farmers see 'improvements' in New 
Zealand's te~s of trage reflected in the wages received by workers 
in the processing sector but deterioration in the terms of trade does 
not lead to wage reductions. Wage increases in the processing and servicing 
sectors are not related to productivity. Federated Farmers (1982. 1983) 
have attempted to justify Supplementary Minimum Prices (SMPs) on the 
grounds of compensation for inflation; inflation compensation is directly 
related to the foregoing argument. 
Compensation for internal protection is also an argument of the 
'second-best'in terms of efficiency. As with trade-protection compensation 
the implications of such compensation are far from clear. Since the 
political barriers to 'first-best' solutions appear to be surmountable 
(given New Zealand's experience in the past few years during which 
some progress has been made) such compensation seems to lack a valid 
rationale on efficiency groundS. 
2.4 Stabilisation 
Farmers face a particularly high degree of income instability 
compared with other economic sectors. This stems from the variability 
of the economic and physical environments in which farming is undertaken. 
Government assistance has been provided to the farming sector in times 
of low ~07orld prices for agricultural commodities, and in times of adverse 
climatic conditions because it has been feared that in the absence 
of stability, farm investment leve£s would fall. In addition, concern 
not only about the level of farm investment, but also about monetary 
stability in the economy as a whole has resulted in the introduction 
of self-funding price stabilisation schemes administered by Producer 
Boards, and the Farm Income Equalisation Scheme. 
There is some doubt as to whether income stability does in fact 
lead to higher levels of investment. The 'permanent-income' hypothesis 
suggests that there are two components to income - permanent (i.e. 
assured) income and transitory income. Consumption decisions are based 
on permanent income while savings and therefore investment are undertaken 
largely out of transitory income. Income stabilisation may, therefore, 
lead to reduced investment. On the other hand it may be argued that 
security of income provides the incentive to undertake continuing investment 
programmes and the knowledge that inputs required for such programmes 
will be available. 
Even if income stability is important for the maintenance of farm 
investment, it may be argued that farmers should be prepared to act 
together in order to stabilise their own incomes and provide for future 
profitability. The issues of price stability and environmental stability 
should be considered separately. 
Stability in times of low prices could be achieved if the farming 
industry itself were to tighten the trigger and minimum price mechanisms 
already in existence. 
One reason why the industry itself may be reluctant to introduce 
trigger and minimum prices which permit only a little deviation in 
the price received by the farmer, is the volume of resources required 
to support the scheme. 
7. 
It may be that in the interests of monetary stability in the economy 
as a whole, and particularly of inflation control (Zanetti et al., 1975), 
the Government believes that part of the benefit of farm price stability 
is external to the agricultural sector, and that intervention is justified. 
In this case, the appropriate Government measure would be the provision 
of the necessary resources provided the price boundaries are sufficiently 
tightened. The resources required in years of low prices could be 
provided at very low interest rates, and the surpluses produced in 
times of high prices held by Government at the same rate. Such a scheme 
should be self-funding in the long-run provided the price range does 
in fact encompass the long-term average price. The introduction of 
policies such as SMPs to maintain investment in times of low prices 
does not appear justified on stabilization grounds. 
Where instability of farm incomes·stems from climatic or other 
physical causes the same degree of externality does not exist since 
droughts, floods etc. tend to be localised rather than nationwide. 
Since adverse physical and climatic events are usually experienced 
regionally rather than nationally the overall effects of such events 
on total agricultural production are unlikely to be very great. The 
benefits of income. stability under such circumstances accrue to the 
farmer to a greater extent than to the nation. Although the individual 
farmer may be unable to sustain a total loss in anyone year even ~ith 
the assistance of such schemes as the Farm Income Equalisation Scheme, 
the industry as a whole can spread risk over a large number of enterprises. 
Thus, the implementation of insurance schemes by the industry itself 
appears the most appropriate mechanism for attaining stability of income 
in the face of environmental variability. 
In summary, Government assistance on stability grounds does not 
appear justified although intervention to ensure that an industry 
adminstered price smoothing scheme is implemented is acceptable because 
of the external benefits associated with such a scheme. In other words, 
the stability argument, although often advanced as a separate issue, 
is really only justifiable on the grounds of market failure. 
2.5 Market Failure 
Market failure is said to exist where there are deviations from 
the assumptions necessary for the functioning of the perfectly competitive 
market. Such effects as externalities, imperfect information and public 
goods are examples of factors which can lead to market failure in the 
agricultural sector. External effects (externalities) generally arise 
from the inability of agricultural sector participants to internalise 
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the benefits of investments. this means that an inadequate level of 
investment can occur. The perfect availability of information to sector 
participants is an important assumption that is often violated. This 
is especially so with regard to market information and information on 
development in management/production techniques. When the marginal 
cost of providing a good or service to an additional consumer is zero 
that good is known as a public good. It is often impossible to provide 
such goods to an individual without making the benefits available to 
other members of society, Market forces are, therefore, unlikely to 
result in the optimal level of provision of public goods. 
Where such deviations from the model exist there is an argument 
for Government intervention in the market system. This intervention 
should act to neutralise the effects of these deviations on the price 
setting mechanism. 
2.5. I Research. 
Agricultural research may be divided into two categories; basic 
and applied. Basic research involves the scientific investigation of 
aspects which need have no immediate application but which often provide 
the basis for subsequent applied research. Applied research is directed 
_ towards solving practical probJems and it is reasonable to believe that 
industry participan.ts would have an economic interest in supporting 
applied research. However, since the provision of the results of such 
research to an additional consumer involves no additional cost, applied 
research complies with the definition of a public good, In order to 
determine the optimal level of research investment, individual valuations 
of research results must be accumulated and the marginal cost of research 
effort equated with the accumulated marginal valuation. Individuals 
within the same industry group would benefit from similar applied production 
research. It would therefore be appropriate for those groups to express 
their valuation of this research by levying members to fund applied 
research. 
In the case of basic research, however, industry and social valuations 
may differ. The applicability of basic research to the activities 
in which the industry is presently engaged may be limited and present 
participants are likely to have less concern for the future than Government 
whose responsibilities are broader. Thus underinvestment in basic research, 
from a social viewpoint may occur if this is left to the private sector. 
Government involvement may therefore be justified. 
Where the costs and benefits of research cannot be fully internalised 
by the investor, there may also be an argument for Government intervention. 
This can take the form of legislative activity to ensure benefits (and 
costs) can be internalised, either through providing protection for 
the research investor (e,g, patent rights, market protection) (Blyth 
and Beck, 1983) or legislating to impose costs on the investor to ensure 
the private recognition of social costs or benefits such as pollution 
or natural scenery. 
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The Government support of research into social areas such as pollution, 
conservation and environmental impacts (e.g. of private developments) 
would be justified as Government (society's representatives) should 
be in the best position to value such public amenities. In addition, 
where social objectives such as employment are considered desirable, 
Government may wish to engage in research into technologies which are 
relatively more labour-intensive than those favoured by the private 
sector. 
Externalities can arise in the areas of market research and new 
product development. Where these exist the level of private investment 
in market research is likely to be below the most efficient level. 
While product branding and product loyalty allow exporters to internalise 
some of the benefits of their research it is possible that not all 
benefits will be captured by the initiating firm. 
In summary, there appear to be strong grounds for believing that 
market failure occurs in the agricultural research fields. 
2.5.2 Information. 
Where price signals do not convey appropriate information to producers 
market failur.e can be said to have occurred. There is considerable 
variability in the world prices facing New Zealand farmers and the 
signals received from them are appropriate only in the short term. 
Rapid change in the level of investment is not practicable in farming 
enterprises, and expected medium to long-term prices should therefore 
be an important determinant in farm investment decisions. 
Whether it may be conceded that the Government, rather than the 
producer, is best equipped to forecast long-term price trends is certainly 
debatable. However, even if one accepts some role for Government, 
it does not provide justification for support policies such as SMPs 
to maintain farmer confidence in times of low prices. Rather, an 
appropriate measure would be the provision of outlook services and 
the constant evaluation of their performance, in order that farmers 
may have access to this information and be able to assess its reliability. 
While it is probable that farmers as a group would be reluctant to 
pay for such a service until the value of the source is proven, in 
time their willingness-to-pay would increase, provided of course that 
the information is reliable. It would then be possible to levy the 
industry to help fund the service. 
2.5.3 Extension. 
It could be argued that farm advisory services should be provided 
to the agricultural sector on a user-pays basis since the benefits 
accrue directly to the farmer. However, there are at least two reasons 
why underinvestment in extension, from the national point of view, 
could occur if all extension were privately funded. 
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The most effective advice is that which convinces the farmer that 
decisions made are entirely his own, and which better equips him for 
future decision-making. Consequently, the value of such advice is 
not likely to be fully perceived and the sector is likely to undervalue 
the benefits from extension effort of this type. 
Many. of the benefits derived from extension programmes, particularly 
at the group or regional level, are realised over a relatively long 
period. If this period exceeds his planning horizon, the farmer may 
be reluctant to pay to participate, although the longer time preference 
of the nation may mean that the investment is justified on the national 
basis. 
In addition, the provision to Government of a large amount of 
information on changes in the farming environment is facilitated by 
the operation of a publicly-funded and therefore impartial extension 
serv~ce . 
In summary, there do appear to be grounds for suspecting that 
market failure occurs in the extension area. However, it may be very 
difficult to measure the social rate of return to investment in extension 
as a first step in justifying assistance in this area. 
2.5.4 Capital 
The present financial market may not provide for the recognition 
of entrepeneurship as adequate security for loan finance. This represents 
an undervaluation of an important factor of production. This means 
that only substantial organisations are able to undertake market research 
and product development as they must have adequate resources to cover 
high potential risks (and losses). There is therefore a need for a 
financial institution with the ability to make funds available to enable 
entrepeneurs to carry out market research and product development, where 
the loan security is based upon an assessment of the likely success 
of the project rather than the assets held by the borrower. Expansion 
of the role of the Development Finance Corporation could be a suitable 
way in which to meet this need. 
2.6 Conclusion 
If the economy is to undergo sustainable economic growth, efficiency 
~n resource allocation is an important prerequisite. In this part 
of the paper the rationale for Government assistance to agriculture 
has been examined primarily with reference to allocative efficiency. 
It has been concluded that compensation for trade protectionism, 
exchange rate overvaluation and internal protectionism cannot be justified. 
These measures simply introduce new distortions to the economy to counteract 
existing policy-induced distortions and are therefore 'second-best' 
solutions whose efficiency implications are unclear. 
11. 
Government assistance to counteract instability in farm incomes 
also appears unwarranted. Self-funding measures, including price smoothing 
and insurance schemes are the appropriate measures to be taken by the 
sector. 
Theoretically acceptable grounds for Government intervention and 
assistance in a market economy are those associated with market failure. 
Probable areas for market failure in the agricultural sector are those 
of research, information, extension and capital. 

3. ALTERNATIVE POLICY MECHANISMS 
3. 1 'First-Best' or 'Second-Best' 
It has been established that the appropriate criterion for the 
introduction of agricultural policies should be the necessity to ensure 
that such policies do not worsen the efficiency of the utilisation 
of resources. In order for the total economy to undergo sustainable 
economic growth, it is important that resources be allocated in the 
most efficient manner possible. 
A number of policies have been introduced by Governments over 
the past fifty years, which, by altering the return to resources used 
in the production process, have created the potential for distortion. 
Where that potential exists it ha-s been concluded that it is inappropriate 
to correct the distortion by compensating the disadvantaged sector 
except where the distortion is a consequence of the failure of the 
market itself. 
'First-best' policies include those which remove distortions caused 
by market intervention, and those which compensate for distortions 
caused by the market itself. 'Second-best' policies seek to compensate 
for induced distortions. The measurement of the level of compensation 
required to adequately redress the effect of the distortion is considered 
to be exceedingly difficult and such measures are likely to be inaccurate. 
Where measurement procedures do not result in an accurate assessment, 
the placement o-f compensat ion measures within the economy could very 
easily contribute to a worsening of the distortion already evident. 
Given this situation, it would therefore be appropriate to consider 
policy measures which act to remove the distortion that has been created 
rather than to introduce exactly compensating distortions. 
Although the 'first--best' solution may be contrary to political 
objectives, acceptance of 'second-best' policies may only delay or 
preclude the introduction of the 'first-best' policies necessary to 
improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the New Zealand economy. 
3.2 Policies for the Economy 
It is apparent that to a large extent, the policies of successive 
New Zealand Governments have had a significant influence on the ability 
of the agricultural sector to use reSOurces in the most efficient manner. 
These influences have affected both the costs of production and the 
returns available from agricultural production. Such policies include 
protection of import-replacement industries, the maintenance of a controlled 
exchange rate, the provision of licencing and regulation requirements 
with respect to internal production and distribution systems and the 
diversity of arrangements relating to New Zealand wage levels. 
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It is therefore suggested that the Government should introduce 
(continue) policies which involve the removal of import licences, other 
methods of providing protection to the import replacement sector and 
export incentives. Such steps are required under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the provisions of the Closer Economic 
Relations agreement with Australia (CER). In conjunction with the 
removal of trade protection measures, removal of controls on the exchange 
rate could result in a reduction of the balance-of-payments constraint. 
However, such a policy, unless combined with other 'first-best' solutions 
and a positive incomes policy would almost certainly lead to higher 
inflation, at least in the short-term, as higher export returns, import 
costs and subsequent second-order effects were built into the costs 
of production in New Zealand. 
Policies which have an impact on local manufacturing and distribution 
systems are also important. Where there is a degree of regulation 
in the internal economy, there is a tendency for costs and prices to 
reflect the value of the regulation as well as the value of the goods 
or services involved. The removal of the regulation and its apparent 
value, can therefore contribute to a reduction in the cost of various 
products and services. 
A further area of undesirable influence upon the New Zealand economy 
is the existence of an imbalance of power between the labour organisations 
and the employers. It is apparent that where wage rates are negotiated, 
the negotiation takes place between a monopoly supplier of labour, 
i.e. the industry union, and a non-monopoly provider of employment 
i.e. the various firms involved in the industry. This imbalance of 
power results in the union movement's being able to extract, from the 
employers, wage increases which exceed the movement in productivity. 
An incomes policy which relates the level of increase in employee remuneration 
to a target increase in productivity is essential in order to avoid 
inflationary pressures. 
The implementation of policies mentioned in this section has the 
potential for more impact on the total economy and the agricultural 
sector than do policies which attempt to compensate any particular 
sector for the advantages enjoyed by other sectors. The removal of 
such advantages is considered to be more appropriate action to undertake 
than the compensation of disadvantaged sectors. Within each sector 
of the economy, however, there may be circumstances where Government 
activity would be appropriate to ensure that market forces are reflected 
in the valuation of the products of the sector and that the resources 
employed in the sector are appropriate. 
3.3 Agricultural Sector Policies Today 
It has been estimated that in the year ended 30 June 1982, the 
gross value of Government assistance to the agricultural sector was 
of the order of $819 million (see Appendix). In fact, this is almost 
certainly an underestimate because it is almost impossible to estimate 
the total value of taxation concessions to the sector. Approximately 
$482 million of the $819 million spent can be broadly classified as 
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assistance to reduce the production costs of the industry. This includes 
input subsidies, credit subsidies and suspensory loans, tax incentives 
and quality control subsidies. An additional $26 million which is 
spent on maintaining the Animal Health Division of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries might also be classified as quality control. 
However, the control of animal diseases such as tuberculosis and brucellosis 
directly benefits society as a whole and the funding of this Division 
may be justified, at least in part, on externality or public goods 
grounds. Price subsidisation through the SMP scheme cost the taxpayer 
almost $220 million while Government funded research and extension 
activities cost $92 million. Only $67,000 was spent on emergency relief. 
See Table I. 
TABLE I 
Categories of Assistance 
(Year ending March 1982) 
Input Subsidies (including 
taxation concessions) 
Credit Subsidies 
Price Subsidies 
Quality Control (Including Animal 
Health) 
Research 
Extension 
Emergency Expenditure 
Other 
$000 
222,571 
213,063 
219,000 
72,189 
74,398 
17,850 
67 
146 
$819,284 
On the basis of the arguments developed earlier, only that part 
of total expenditure directed to research, extension and animal health 
(i.e. directed towards the correction of market failure) could be 
considered justified. In the year ending March 1982 expenditure on 
these areas represented only 14 per cent of the total assistance provided 
by Government to the agricultural sector. 
The remaining 86 per cent has been aimed at cost reduction in 
areas where market failure is not inherent, or at price stabilisation. 
This expenditure cannot be justified without accepting the 'second-best' 
arguments discussed earlier. It is unlikely that even the 14 per cent 
of expenditure devoted to research, extension etc. can be wholly justified 
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on market failure grounds. It is not clear at present therefore, what 
proportion of total agricultural assistance can be justified on 'first-
best' grounds. 
3.4 Future Assistance Policies 
Provided that other distortions in the economy are to be removed 
gradually, agricultural assistance (compensation) should be removed 
at a similar rate. However, it is still necessary to determine the 
appropriate level and type of assistance which should be available 
to compensate for market failure. At present there is insufficient 
information available on the economic value of research, information 
dissemination and extension to answer this question with any certainty. 
This leads to another very important question for agricultural 
economists - whether it is of value to research the costs of market 
failure in these areas? Clearly this is a difficult field to research 
but we believe that more effort should be devoted to social-cost-benefit 
studies in these areas .. Only when the results of such studies are 
available will the distribution of Government assistance to the agricultural 
sector be possible on an efficient basis. 
Earlier in this paper the areas in which the market model may 
not work adequately were listed, together with reasons why market failure 
may occur in these areas. However, there are likely to be other areas 
where market failure could be identified and intervention and assistance 
argued to be appropriate. 
Are economists likely to agree on the areas and reasons for market 
failure? Some economists may argue that identifying potential market 
failures is fruitless since evidence to substantiate claims that Government 
action is required to increase overall economic welfare is too sparse 
and difficult to gather. Others may argue that many social and institutional 
factors are behind the market failure and that these factors should 
be taken as given. If resources flow out of a particular sector for 
such reasons, it has to be accepted. This is the perfectly free-market 
philosophy. Those who accept the free-market philosophy do so because 
they believe that the market is the most efficient means of resource 
allocation. However, reliance on market forces when there are elements 
of market failure present can only lead to less than optimal resource 
allocation. Where social and institutional factors influence the operation 
of the market, the costs in terms of resource misallocation must be 
recognised when determining the value of those factors to society. 
However, if protection of other economic sectors is not removed 
and agricultural assistance continues, in others words, if 'first-best' 
solutions are not politically acceptable, should agricultural economists 
be attempting to determine the most satisfactory of what can only be 
considered 'second-best' solutions? 
It is the authors' opinion that agricultural economists have 
a responsibility to continue advocating 'first-best' policies to politicians. 
Where political objectives can be met only by the implementation of 
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'second-best' policies, it is the professional responsibility of agricultural 
.economists to evaluate all such policies in terms of their implications 
for resource allocation and their effectiveness in achieving the 
stated objectives. Continual evaluation of Government policy by economists 
is essential, and the results of such evaluation must be publicly discussed 
in order that, as th.e costs of 'second-best' policy measures are more 
widely understood, the political acceptance of 'first-best' measures 
is facilitated. 
Where Government has objectives which relate to matters of equity 
and distribution rather than efficiency, the costs of measures taken 
to achieve these objectives must be identified as far as possible. 
Government has a clear responsibility to ensure that such goals are 
explicitly stated. 
In conclusion, there should be a movement away from Government 
policy measures which compensate for distortions in the economy. The 
only economically rational policies are those which attempt to correct 
market failure. Only if such an approach is adopted can the most efficient 
allocation of resources be achieved. 
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APPENDIX 
Government Financial Involvement With New Zealand Agriculture 
by J.G. Pryde and G. Greer 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The total value of Government involvement in New Zealand agriculture 
cannot be calculated with complete accuracy. Revenue foregone as a 
consequence of taxation concessions offered to farmers is particularly 
difficult to estimate since much farm development expenditure is included 
in taxation accounts as working expenditure. Differences of opinion 
may exist concerning the propo_rtion of total assistance which represents 
an income supplement and is therefore liable to tax, and it is difficult 
to decide exactly which Government services should be included as indirect 
forms of farmer assistance. The methods by which interest concessions 
should be calculated may also be subject to debate. However, although 
it is true that, for the purposes of this calculation, some arbitrary 
decisions have been made, they have in most cases been made only after 
communication with the appropriate Government Departments, or discussion 
with other economic researchers. Most of the information included 
has been obtained from published annual reports etc, or from the answers 
provided in response to questions asked in the House of Representatives. 
The sources of both published and unpublished data~ as well as the 
methods of calculation used are documented in Section F. 
The following exercise attempts to present in summary form estimates 
of the New Zealand Government's general and financial involvement in 
the agricultural industry in the years ended March 1979-82. Estimates 
have been prepared both of gross involvement and of involvement net 
of taxation due on the income supplement component. Each page must 
be read in conjunction with the above paragraph and the details of 
sources and-methods of calculation as described in Part F of this Apperidix. 
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B. SERVICES PROVIDED TO THE RURAL SECTOR BY GOVERNMENT 
Ministry -of Agriculture and Fisheries: 
1. Farm advisory service 
2. Meat inspection 
3. Dairy product grading 
4. Farm dairy instruction 
5. Seed certification 
6. Seed testing 
7. Game inspection 
8. Livestock inspection 
9. New Zealand grown fruit and vegetable inspection 
10. Inspection of plant material for export 
11. Honey inspection 
12. Agricultural research 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research: 
13. Agricultural research and educational services 
Ministry of Works and Development: 
14. Investigation and design of irrigation and rural water supply schemes 
15. Planning and technical services in the field of soil and water 
conservation 
De-partment of Lands and Survey: 
16. Budgetary advice to mortgagors 
17. Land Utilisation advice 
Rural Banking and Finance Corporation: 
18. Administration of loans and mortgages 
23. 
Maori Affairs Department: 
19. Budgetary advice to mortgagors 
20. Supervision of development schemes on behalf of Maori owners (at no 
charge until they return a profit) 
21. Land utilisation advice 
Forest Service 
22 Administration of Forestry Encouragement Grants 
The cost to the Government of these services ~s included among the costs of 
indirect assistance. 
Source: Hansard No.8, P. 895, 1980. 
C. PRINCIPAL FORMS OF DIRECT GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO FARMERS AND THE RURAL 
SECTOR SHOWN BY VOTE 
1) Vote: Agriculture & Fisheries 1 
* Special Agricultural Assistance 
* Fertiliser & Lime Transport Subsidy 
* Fertiliser Price Subsidy 
* Fertiliser & Lime Bounty 
* Sharemilkers Suspensory Loan Scheme 
* Pipfruit Pesticides Rebate 
* Contribution to Meat Income 
Stabilisation Acc. 
* Contribution to Wool Income 
Stabilisation Acc. 
* Emergency Expenditure 
* Lime Transport Assistance 
Special Payment to Freezing Industry 
* Dairy Beef Scheme 
Meat Industry Hygiene Grant 
Grant to New Zealand Wool Board 
* Land Development Encouragement Loans 
Interest Subsidy 
* Rural Export Suspensory Loans 
* Special Payment for Sheep and Cattle 
* Livestock Incentive Scheme 
Interest on Loans 
* Feed Storage Construction Subsidy 
* Artificial Breeding Incentive 
* Lucerne Establishment Grant 
Agricultural Pests Control 
CARRIED FORWARD 
* See Note 17. 
1979 - 80 
($000) 
28,771 
40,550 
2,371 
400 
341 
676 
1,402 
2,000 
1,024 
31 
49 
7,009 
735 
40 
6,867 
1980 - 81 
($000) 
25,306 
30,835 
1,965 
366 
689 
2,313 
3,424 
288 
13 
11,5-l3 
55 
7,413 
1981 - 82 
($000) 
24,101 
28,211 
1,672 
407 
67 
1,752 
6,595 
579 
I~, 127 
7,003 
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R. CONT. 
Assistance to Hydatids Authority 
Control & Eradication of Animal 
Diseases 
Compensation 
Grants & Miscellaneous Payments to 
Agricultural & Allied Organisations 
Noxious Weeds Eradic.ation 
* Cartage Grants 
* Supplementary Minimum Prices SCheme2 
Wool 
Dairy 
Meat 
Subsidy on Sheep Measles Control 
Sulphuric Acid Transport Subsidy 
* Assistance to the Tobacco Industry 
Local Market Butter Termination Payment 
Subsidy for Control of Potato Cyst 
Nematode 
SUB TOTAL 
2) Vote: Lands and Survey3 
Grants to Lincoln College 
Grant to Tussock Grasslands & 
Mountain. Lands Institute 
SUB TOTAL 
3:) Vote: Scientific and Industrial Research4 
Grant to Massey University 
Grant to Lincoln College 
Grants to Research Associations 
Dairy 
Fertil iser 
MeatS 
WoolS 
Grant to Commonwealth Agricultural 
Bureaux 
Grant to Cawthron Institute 
Trials of new Horticultural Crops 
SUB TOTAL 
1979 - 80 
($000) 
2,737 
17 
2,430 
10,739 
1,896 
381 
110,466 
1979 - 80 
($000) 
31 
274 
305 
158 
85 
1,055 
195 
720 
658 
94 
366 
3,331 
1980 - 81 
($000) 
4,540 
93 
3,218 
9,002 
520 
610 
7,000 
109,163 
1980 - 81 
($000) 
38 
364 
402 
209 
78 
I, 193 
288 
1,148 
816 
115 
410 
4,257 
1981 - 82 
($000) 
970 
6,938 
146 
3,813 
9,259 
148,000 
7] ,000 
610 
9,575 
5 
339,830 
1981 - 82 
($000) 
45 
423 
468 
238 
20 
1,505 
285 
1,091 
893 
147 
477 
19 
4,675 
C. CONT. 
* Forestry Encouragement Grants 6 
TOTAL GROSS DIRECT ASSISTANCE: 
1979 - 80 
($000) 
1,429 
115,531 
1980 - 81 
($000) 
1,46 I 
115,283 
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1981 - 82 
($000) 
2,004 
346,977 
D. PRINCIPAL FORMS OF INDIRECT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENT TO THE AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR 
a) Expenditure 
I) Vote: Agriculture & Fisheries7 
* An-imal Heal th 
* Meat Inspection 
* Dairy Inspection and Grading 
* Advisory Services 
Agricultural Research 
SUB TOTAL 
2) Vote: Works and Development8 
* Investigation and Construction of 
irrigation schemes (net expenditure 
after recoveries)9 . 
* Maintenance and operation of irrigation 
schemes (net, after revenue from sale 
of water) 
3) 
Catchment, river control, soil 
conservation and drainage works 
SUB TOTAL 
Vote: Scientific and Industrial 
Agriculture Production 
Agriculture Processing Research 
SUB TOTAL 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
Research lO 
1979 - 80 
($000) 
15,277 
25,333 
5,912 
11,973 
24,019 
82,514 
6,700 
768 
19,691 
27,159 
15,362 
1,579 
16,941 
126,614 
1980 - 81 
($000) 
19,822 
31,093 
7,090 
14,70 I 
30,049 
102,755 
13,945 
1,025 
23,977 
38,947 
19,040 
1,803 
20,843 
162,545 
1981 - 82 
($000) 
25,729 
38,280 
8,180 
17,850 
35,786 
125,825 
20,868 
1,274 
25,922 
48,064 
23,402 
6,254 
29,656 
203,545 
26. 
b) Estimates of Revenue Foregone 
I) Rural Banking & Finance 
Corporation 
* Estimate of Interest Concessions I I 
* Voted Interest Concessions l2 
SUB TOTAL 
2) Taxation 
Estimated Total Cost of Taxation 
Concessions - at least l3 
Note: 
1979 - 80 
($000) 
75,263 
5,667 
80,930 
50,000 
1980 - 81 1981 - 82 
($000) ($000) 
87,281 88,116 
8,750 7.190 
96,03 r 95,306 
82,000 82,000 
These include deductions for development expenditure, income equalisation, standard 
values, farm ownership and vendor mortgage schemes; investment allowances on 
machinery; first year depreciation allowances; and the taxation option of the 
livestock incentive scheme. However it is almost certain that deductions for 
development expenditure are underestimated since a large proportion of development 
expenditure.is included as working expenses in farm accounts. 
3) Reserve Bank Overdraft Facility l4 
Estimated total cost of low interest 
rate Overdraft Facility 43,000 64,000 74,850 
Assistance is provided to the Apple and Pear Marketing Board, the Dairy Board, 
the Citrus Marketing Authority," and the Honey Marketing Authority. 
4) Lands and Syrvey - Loans to Settlers l5 
* Estimate of Interest Concessions 
5) Maori Affairs - Loans to Settlers l6 
* Estimate of Interest Concessions 
* Government Grant Towards Deficit 
SUB TOTAL 
TOTAL REVENUE FOREGONE 
TOTAL GROSS INDIRECT ASSISTANCE 
10,240 
3,206 
599 
3,805 
187,975 
314,589 
10,659 
3,421 
791 
4,212 
256,902 
419,447 
I 1,924 
3,986 
696 
4,682 
268,762 
472,307 
E. SUMMARY GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO NEW ZEALAND AGRICULTURE 
Gross Direct Assistance 
Gross Indirect Assistance 
TOTAL GROSS ASSISTANCE 
Income Supplement component 
Tax assessed on incom~ supplement 
component (at .30)17 
TOTAL NET ASSISTANCE 
Total Net Government Expenditure l8 
Gross Government Assistance to 
Agriculture as a percentage of 
total net Government expenditure 
Net Government Assistance to 
Agriculture as a percentage of 
total net Government expenditure 
Agricultural Proprietors' Surplus 
Gross Government Assistance to 
Agriculture as a percentage of 
the agricultural proprietors' 
surplus 
Export earnings from Agricultural 
Production2"O 
Gross Government Assistance to 
Agriculture as a percentage of 
Agricultural export earnings 
Net Government Assistance to 
Agriculture as a percentage of 
Agricultural export earnings 
F. SOURCES AND METHODS OF CALCULATION 
1979 - 80 
($000) 
115,531 
314,589 
430,120 
180,297 
54,089 
376,031 
7,586,700 
5.67 
4.96 
1,442,000 
29.83 
3,571,702 
12.04 
10.53 
1980 - 81 
($000) 
115,283 
419,447 
534,730 
186,817 
56,045 
478,685 
9,133,400 
5.85 
5.24 
1,244,000 
42.98 
4,139,669 
12.92 
11.56 
27. 
1981 - 82 
($000) 
346,977 
472,307 
819,284 
422,549 
126,765_ 
692,519 
11,196,500 
7.32 
6.-19 
1,230,000 
66.61 
4,738,600 
17.29 
14.61 
I. All data except those on S.M.P.s have been obtained from the 'Estimates' 
1980, 1981, 1982 - Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries: Expenditure Items. 
2. Supplementary Minimum Price payments made to farmers are financed temporarily 
by Reserve Bank overdraft and are not necessarily charged against Vote 
Agriculture during the year in which the payments are made. Thus the figures 
presented in this table, which are M.A.F. Economics Division estimates of 
the payments actually made to farmers, differ from those presented in the 
'Estimates'. S.M.P. payments have been calculated for the years ending March 30. 
3. 'Estimates '. 1980, 198 I, 1982 - Department of Lands and Survey: Expenditure 
Items. 
" 
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4. 'Estimates' 1980, 1981, 1982 - Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research: Program I Science: Program II Government Grants 
5. Building grants to research organisations have been added to the grants 
made towards annual operating costs. 
6. New Zealand Forest Service: Annual Reports, 1980, 1981, 1982. Total 
value of grants made during the year. 
7. 'Estimates' 1980, 1981, 1982 - Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries: 
Programs IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X. 
Included in these amounts is the cost to the Government 'of providing 
the following services which have not been charged for since 1978: meat 
inspection, dairy produce grading, farm dairy instruction, seed certification, 
seed testing, game inspection, livestock inspection, New Zealand grown 
fruit and vegetable inspection, export plant material inspection, and 
honey inspection. 
8. 'Estimates' 1980, 1981, 1982 - Ministry of Works and Development Program 
VIII National Water and Soil Conservation. 
9. This figure includes the cost of irrigation suspensory loans in the 
year the loans are made, not the year in which they are waived. 
10. 'Estimates' 1980~ 1981, 1982 - Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research. Notes to the Estimates: Programs I and II. 
II. Rural Banking and Finance Corporation: Annual Reports 1980, 1981, 1982. 
Calculated by mUltiplying the average value of mortgage assets for the 
year under review and the preceding year by the market rate of interest 
and subtracting the interest earned on Loans on Mortgage. From this 
should be subtracted the value of subsidies which represent that part 
of the interest concession. for which the R.B.F.C. is reimbursed via 
the Public Account. The value of subsidies is calculated as total 
interest recovered from the public account less provision for tax less 
surplus for the year. These values can be obtained from the Notes to 
the Balance Sheet and Revenue Account. Market rate of interest has 
been assumed to be 15% which is the rate assumed by Treasury to be appropriate 
for these calculations. 
12. The vo~ed interest concession is the value of subsidies as c~lculated 
in note II. 
13. Sources of these data are: i) Hansard No.8, 1980: P. 896 
ii) Parliamentary Order Paper (22 April 1982): 
P. 18 J. 
14. Reserve Bank of New Zealand (pers. comm.). This subsidy is calculated 
from the average week-day balances and yields in the following accounts 
compared with typical market interest rates for similar accounts: Dairy 
industry account - I per cent compared with assumed market rate of 12 per 
cent; Apple and pear industry account - 1 percent compared with assumed 
market rate of 13 percent; Honey industry account - 1 percent compared 
~ith assumed market rate of 13 percent. 
15. Department of Lands and Survey: Annual Reports 1980, 1981, 1982. 
Total value of Marginal Lands Board loans, Mortgages Pt IV of the Land 
Act and advances associated with sales of land and improvements was 
determined from the Balance Sheet for Crown Lands. The opening and 
29. 
closing values were averaged and multiplied by the market rate of interest. 
The interest foregone has been estimated as the difference between interest 
payable at market rates and the· interest actually paid on each of the 
asset categories as presented in the Crown Lands Profit and Loss Account. 
16. Department-of Maori Affairs: Annual Reports 1980, 1981, 1982. 
The same method of calculating interest foregone as· described in note 15 
was used. For 1979-80 and 1980-81 the relevant asset values (derived 
from the Maori Land Development and Settlement Account Balance Sheet) 
were the sums of Advances to stations, advances to settlers, advances 
under Section 460 of the Maori Affairs Act and Rehabilitation Advances 
to settlers. Interest earned on advances was derived from the Revenue 
Accounts. The Government grant towards the deficit has been subtracted 
from the gross interest concession and is entered separately. 
In 1981/82 the value of the interest concession presented has actually 
been calculated for the June year since the balance date for the relevant 
accounts has been changed. The account format has also been altered 
and mortgage assets have been derived from both the Ma·ori Lands Development 
and Settlement Account and the Rural Lending Account Balance Sheets 
and the interest paid is presented in the revenue statements for these 
accounts. 
17. Subsidies on inputs, outputs, interest etc. which are paid by Government 
to farmers may be paid directly as in the case of S.M.P. 's, or indirectly 
as in the case of fertiliser subsidies which are paid to the manufacturer. 
If such subsidies increase farmers' 'net-before-tax' income, either 
by reducing operating costs, or by increasing gross income, then Government 
receives a proportion of the subsidy back as income tax. 
In this calculation, the decision as to which measures of Government 
expenditure represent an income supplement has been made arbitrarily 
on the basis of whether the expenses presently met by Government would otherwise be 
borne by the individual farmer or by the farming or agricultu~al sector as 
a whole. Items regarded as income supplements are marked ,vith an asterisk. 
Although tax payable should be calculated according to the marginal 
tax rates paid by farmers, these cannot be ·calculated and the average 
tax rate has been employed instead. 
The Department of Inland Revenue cannot provide statistics on farm taxatio·n 
for the latest two years included in this calculation. However, the 
average tax rates of farmers (calculated as Assessable Tax 7 Total Assessable 
income) for the years ending 31 March 1979 and 1980 were .291 and .301 
respectively. Therefore, for the purpose of this exercise it has been 
assumed that tax has been paid on the income supplement of direct assistance 
at the average rate of 30%. 
f8. New Zealand Treasury 'The Budget': Table 1. 
19. The most comprehensive measure of the proprietors' surplus (before taxation) 
is the estimate of operating surplus less interest paid, which is prepared 
by the Department of Statistics for the national accounts. The statistics 
shown in the table below record the total value of the farming industry's 
30. 
output less all production related expenditure and interest payments. 
No deduction has been made for income tax. The farming industry is 
defined to cover agricultural and agricultural contracting activities 
of persons, partnerships, trusts and companies. 
Year Ended 31 March 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Operating Surplus Less Interest 
Payments ($million) 
571 
835 
714 
969 
1,442 
1,244 
1,230* 
* - N.Z.I.E.R. Quarterly Predictions September 1982 Forecast minus 
interest at same proportion as 1980/81 
:0. Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin 45(5) June 1982: Overseas Exchange 
Transactions Calculated as Total Exports less miscellaneous, manufactured 
exports and forest products. The value of fish (fresh and chilled) 
and rock lobster exports, derived from the Monthly Abstract of Statistics 
Table 11.03 'Value of Principal Exports' has also been subtracted. 
lOS. 
106. 
107. 
108 .• 
109. 
110. 
Ill. 
il2. 
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